The examination of the external and internal financing of the American debt raises a certain number of questions.
1 ° On the American market, the surpluses of the social funds will continue to play their role of financing of the debt. It is a safe bet that the US holders – direct and indirect – of the market debt will still cover in a near future issue of treasury bills.
2 ° The problems could seriously come from Asia. The support of China and Japan are political supports, purchases of treasury bills are the simple conversion of their trade surpluses. The preservation of these surpluses depends on the existence of a highly positive trade balance, which is not the case today. As for the mobilization of national savings resources to be transferred to the US, it is very closely linked to the national support and recovery measures that could limit their volume. From this point of view, the risk of weakening Asian support comes more from Japan than from China, which has impressive savings reserves from companies, individuals, and the state. But the financing needs of the US are far from exhausted.
3 ° Regarding external financing, one can not rule out the fact that a country must liquidate these investments in treasury bills to repatriate capital. Countries like Brazil or Russia may be risks to the US debt tomorrow. However, the punctual difficulties of a creditor country of the federal state are in no way a major danger, an international support union would quickly come to the rescue of the USA in case of imminent risk.
The main problem is the debt consolidation undertaken since November 2008.
Long-maturity debt securities (bonds and notes) constitute 80% of foreign investments. In the United States, long-maturity debt securities are mainly bought by the “social funds”, that is, the funds and trust funds that are placed under the trusteeship of the Treasury. The consolidation of the American debt is therefore administered firstly by foreign states – China and Japan in the lead – and secondly by the US Treasury. And the rapid growth of the federal debt makes a firm consolidation inevitable only since the victory of President Obama.
In a climate of general uncertainty, US investors preferred to refer massively to short-term debt securities (T. Bills et al), as shown by the growth of mutual fund shares in 2008 in debt financing, The US short-term debt is essentially owned by US investors and the debt consolidation is abandoned to social funds and foreign investors who are politically controlled. This double administration of the debt is another paradox in a country where the liberal credo was saved in extremis by … public money.
Should we see in the attitude of American investors a distrust of the Treasury? Probably not! A fear of inflation? It’s certain. A short-term investment waiting for better days and higher salary levels, that’s for sure!
What to say? For the US Treasury, financing-debt consolidation will cost more and more in the US market because of the greed of private US investors who remain on the lookout for the best opportunities. US investors are going to give the rate of return on capital as the US economy will show signs of improvement. They are the ones who will arbitrate public investments, more profitable private placements with the effect of increasing financing for the Treasury if this arbitration is in favor of the private sector. The two pillars of the administered debt, the social funds, and the foreign capitals politically administered will only follow and align with their claims.
Competition from the financing needs of the State and the economy in the recovery phase will inevitably stimulate a recovery in the level of remuneration of public bonds across the range of securities with variable maturity, the 10-year loans being the best indicator of market requirements. Debt consolidation can only strengthen the hand of private investors. This is already the case since January, interest rates on securities long treasure slowly rising.
The following is predictable: rising interest rates leading to a heavy relapse of the US economy due to a less lax financial and fiscal policy or continuation of this policy with ultimately a risk of Krash bond can be avoided only by a slowdown in borrowing, and consequently a move away from the policy of support and massive recovery of the economy.
The US financing capacity during the period of federal debt consolidation http://photofeaturesint.com/difference-between-section-7-bankruptcy-vs-debt-consolidation.html/ is as much the solution as the problem. This problem has a name: the American financial market with the greed of its actors and their absolute indifference to the real economy of their country. The structure of foreign support is exemplary of the global solidarities of the world oligarchy sharing with the “American elites” the same representations and especially the same interests.
Obama did not come to power with a policy of questioning the model of the financialized economy set up under Reagan. It could be fatal for him. The long-term green growth policy masks a lack of short-term policy. Faced with financial capital, this administration has not given itself the means to assert itself because it has not asked for a mandate from US citizens.
Foreign investors by financing long-term US debt differ the risks of a deeper crisis while increasing the risk of its burst through political support. It is possible that investing in the US, globalization and the preservation of their own economic and financial interests, foreign countries have invested in lost funds. Everything will depend on the sustainability of US sovereign debt financing, which should not be taken for granted. The Treasury bill bubble inexorably swells … like yesterday the real estate bubble and before yesterday the stock market bubble.
Appearances are misleading: the key question is not how long will the USA be able to benefit from the financial support of Asia – China, and Japan in mind. They have everything to lose by interrupting it.
The key question is at what level of compensation US investors will want to hedge the continued growth of a federal debt being consolidated.